Back in the 90’s, after the Soviet system collapsed, there was a serious debate on whether Central and Eastern European countries should join NATO or not. All sorts of pros and cons where taken into consideration, ending with a two wave admission into organization’s structure.

The newcomers were instilled with the Soviet style so a new set of strategies, values and principles were to be adopted if they wanted to become democratic countries and have a real security shield against the East. Curiously, one among the many other raised concerns was that new countries didn’t speak NATO’s language (English) either, while most of their armies’ members were reluctant to start learning it, besides the rest of all the needed changes.

In the end it’s been decided: bringing this region closer to Western Europe, helping it with the democratic transitional processes and avoiding both a security vacuum and a clash between West and East (1) were only some of NATO’s main arguments and purposes to allow its expansion. New members got relieved by the Soviet burden and started an assiduous process to get on board in a ‘Western’ governing style and defense paradigm, with a great deal of effort to learn ‘the new language’.

However, since there was no bigger threat for NATO to fight against, such as the one faced during the bipolar world system, a new change of paradigm was required even for this institution. It was agreed that NATO shouldn’t be only a hard core defense agency but also one to promote democracy and human rights’ protection where other countries wouldn’t respect them or if their violations would pose a threat for the Western world.

After the admission, new member states got used to NATO’s span of attention in the region, especially since it needed careful treatment on its way to democratization (2). But not until recently, the same states were confronted with another so called ‘security vacuum’ as the soviet threat decreased and their ‘guardian’ organization slowly took their hands off them. If one adds to this new situation the economic crises and USA’s switch of attention from Europe to Asia, it can be easily understood the sort of ‘practical’ gap left between western members of NATO and Central and Eastern European ones, now left on ‘their owns’.

Faced with such a ‘demoralizing’ new reality, some countries such as Poland and the other members of the Visegrad 4 structure came to realize that, in order to really have a voice on a global and a European scene, you must indeed have one on at a regional level, too. Besides the political aspects, states were to take into consideration the economic, democratic and human rights ones also in order to acquire a true leadership stance. As in any such situations, initiatives in these areas aren’t easy to be accomplished. Same goes when it comes to the military ones also, especially if we consider current economic crises and all defense budget cuts that came as a consequence.

Even if this stands true, one can see the great efforts that have been done already for a joint project in countries that were unused to collaborate and share their resources, even if they have common past and future goals.(3) At the beginning of March this year, Poland’s initiative to invite Visegrad 4 and Weimer Triangle countries for a ‘small talk’ on EU’s future and defense issues must drag one’s attention over a new process that central European countries have started. It is a sign they are learning a new language and focus their attention on neighboring countries as sound partners for a relevant voice and common interests. Besides talks about solutions to exit current economic crises, it must be noted the initiative to organize a military structure that can act in missions outside their boundaries.

Each V4 country assumed a certain role under the umbrella of a joint defense battle group composed of approximately 3000 soldiers, with Angela Merkel and Francois Holland’s ‘blessing’ and with an expressed desire of not double layering NATO’s structures.(4) This could be a new beginning for Central Europe to become more relevant and credible in its efforts to have a common voice, without expecting NATO solve all their problems but, at the same time, without excluding it at all. It is a kind of a healthy symbiosis between old and new NATO members states, that was needed and welcomed.

Where does Romania stand at this point? It is clearly outside these efforts. Even though it has an outspoken support for and high hopes in NATO’ structures, it has not understood nor learned the new language of Central European states and holds on the old paradigm that its defense and status as an equal or worthy country must come mostly from NATO’s members ends. Even more, it seems that neighboring countries are too small and meaningless for her to give them any attention as Romania wants to work only with the ‘big players’. Until it will learn what’s happening around it might be too late to diminish the gap between itself and the rest of the already active neighboring states. Romania is correctly waiting to be treated as United Kingdom or Germany but this happens while cutting drastically its defense budget, for example, and is overseeing some great opportunities that are right around the corner.

Stepping on the other side, it is in NATO’s best interest to now encourage regional actors have their own voices and be relevant on the global scene while all speaking the same language and sharing the same values and principles. It is less and less feasible for it to invest in Europe as during post Cold War era, while other regions of the globe became more important to it and while Europe should be strong enough to care for itself. Nonetheless, this doesn’t mean NATO is ignoring current ongoing issues in Eastern Europe or the continent as a whole, but is looking to increase European states’ level of responsibility and engagement. In a certain way, what NATO has done for Western Europe, Western Europe has done for Central Europe. Now it’s last’s turn to do it for Eastern Europe, especially under NATO’s new paradigm of shifting attention from a defensive approach to a democratization one. And Romania should learn this new lesson shortly if it is to stay relevant in the game.

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1 Partnership with the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe, Statement issued by the North Atlantic Council Meeting in Ministerial Session, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-229A89910ECBA982/natolive/official_texts_23858.htm
2 Bene, Gyula, NATO expansion in Central and Eastern Europe, 1996-1997, http://www.fas.org/man/eprint/bene.htm

3 Hamacek, Jan and Jan Kulhanek, The Future of NATO lies in Central Europe?, June 14, 2012, http://www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/future-nato-lies-central-europe
4 Merkel and Hollande join Visegrad Group, Gazeta Wyborcza, quoted by PressEurope, March 7th, 2013 http://www.presseurop.eu/en/content/news-brief/3506271-merkel-and-hollande-join-visegrad-group

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This analyses has been done in the wake of my participation at Sibiu NATO Spring School, first of this kind in Romania, and its content wasn’t fully supported by a more indepth research effort. More will follow.